Is multi-aligned, non-aligned by another name?
India, China, the Global South and the shifting sands of the global geopolitical landscape
Namaste Folks,
Last weekend’s G20 summit has me back in geo-political writing mode - my erstwhile bread and butter. As I say at the end of the post, we live in interesting times, certainly deserving of comment and analysis. Also, a caveat : as much as India’s emerging role as bridge builder on the global stage is creditable, there is the ironic corollary of the same government sowing division with anti-minority policies domestically. That said, read on:
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The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has had the unintended consequence of waking up the Cold War-engendered geostrategic bloc, the non-aligned movement, from its post-fall-of-the-Berlin-Wall-slumber. In its reinvigorated avatar, the grouping’s au courant appellation is the Global South.
At the G20 meeting held in New Delhi earlier in September, there was a moment when the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, stood next to the Indonesian President, Joko Widodo: an image that recalled the Nehru-Sukarno moments at the Asia-Africa conference of 1955 in Bandung. It was there that the non-aligned movement was birthed, wherein (in theory, if not always in practice) “third world countries” refused to align themselves with either the United States, or the USSR, in their nuclear-fueled, ideological faceoff.
This time, it is the perception of the “West” corralling the globe into taking sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, without regard for the often-devastating, developmental consequences for the rest of the world, that has nations from India to South Africa, Bolivia and beyond, reject the binary logic of “you are either with us, or against us.” Sanctions imposed on Russia, for example. have raised food and fertilizer prices across the world, harming millions of citizens in developing countries.
The non-aligned movement du jour is in fact a multi-aligned movement, where nations of the Global South are asserting their autonomy to have geopolitical relationships that crisscross the strategic lines considered sacrosanct by the rich group of G-7 nations (self-described as “the steering committee of the free world”).
And this time, the Global South has the economic and demographic heft that makes its stance difficult to ignore. Back in the days of the non-aligned Bandung conference, the U.S. alone accounted for nearly 50% of global GDP. Today, the BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and other recently added members to the grouping like Argentina, Egypt and Iran) countries comprise 37% of the world economy, a number that is only projected to grow. In contrast, the 30% of global GDP currently attributable to the West, is a figure projected to decline. Further, the BRICS+ represent 46% of the planet’s population compared to the less than 10% accounted for by the G7 nations.
A natural consequence of these shifts is a loosening of the G-7’s sway over multi-lateral institutions, with “the rest” gaining greater say in shaping the ostensibly universal “rules-based order.” It was this dynamic that was in the spotlight at the recent G20 summit, which saw the 55-nation strong, African Union, inducted as the grouping’s 21st permanent member.
Significantly, a joint declaration was released, with watered-down language on the Russia-Ukraine war, acknowledging that there were “different views and assessments of the situation.” And the concerns of developing countries from climate financing to the need for overhauling multilateral development banks, particularly Western-led institutions like the World Bank, were centered.
The G20 is usually a staid meeting featuring platitudes mouthed by leaders, of the kind that merits a few minutes on the nightly news, to be quickly forgotten in the excitement of the announcement of a new Taylor Swift concert or Shah Rukh Khan movie.
But this summit, the 18th in the grouping’s history, was unique. To begin with, the host, India’s Prime Minister, used the platform as a way to show-off his international standing to his domestic audience (where elections are scheduled for next year), as well as to showcase a muscular India on the international stage.
Moreover, it was an unexpectedly deft example of the ability to gain consensus in what can sometimes appear to be an irreparably fractured world. By getting countries with hugely divergent world views to sign on to a joint communique, Mr. Modi, with the help of other leaders - Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia have been named in particular- has put paid to the notion of the impossibility of understanding between East and West, à la Kipling’s, “never the twain shall meet” refrain.
How was this feat accomplished? The answer lies with the elephant (or dragon if we are being precise with our bestial metaphors) that was not in the room – China. President Xi Jinping chose not to attend the summit, allowing Mr. Modi to chalk up a victory in the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry for spokesperson of the Global South. This was a victory that was undoubtedly helped by an anxious “West” for whom democratic India is a preferable interlocutor to the authoritarian, and more antagonistic China. Signing on to the Delhi consensus communique might not have served the G7’s line on Russia, but it should be read as a move to limit China’s credentials in the Global South.
Over the last few years both China and India have been in propaganda-overdrive to assert their putative leadership of the non-Western world. India, under Modi, has been claiming to be a “vishwaguru” or world teacher, while China’s slogan of choice is offering a “Community of Common Destiny,“ as an alternative to the West-dominated international order.
Recent years have seen attempts by both Asian behemoths to gather support in the Global South. In early March, Beijing mediated reconciliation between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran, an impressive achievement. But before that Beijing had been expanding its influence by providing large-scale financial support for infrastructure development in Asia and Africa under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since the 2010s.
India, in its turn hosted a “Voice of Global South Summit” in January this year, with the explicit goal of ensuring that this voice was heard at the G20. At the G20 meeting, Mr. Modi also announced the launch of a multinational rail and shipping project, linking India with the Middle East and Europe, an alternative maritime-heavy BRI, if you will. This in addition to the sales pitch New Delhi has been making to developing countries for its digital public infrastructure offerings, a low-cost, software-based version of the BRI. There has been some interest generated in countries ranging from the Philippines and Sri Lanka, to Morocco, Ethiopia and Guinea.
However, the cold fact is that in terms of its economic clout, Beijing is far ahead of New Delhi as a global player. India's 2022 nominal GDP was about one-sixth that of China's. For years, Beijing has been making no strings investments, as an alternative to the strings-attached aid preferred by the West, across the developing world. From Africa to Latin America and Southeast Asia, the Chinese have invested in oil and gas, set up electric vehicle and battery companies, installed broadband, and built train networks, pipelines and ports.
Many of the countries of the Global South have a deeply enmeshed economic relationship with China. Between 2000 and 2019 China’s trade with the 10 ASEAN countries, for example, rose from $29 billion to $669 billion. The equivalent figure for trade with Latin America grew from $18 billion to $315 billion. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has just reported that China is ahead of the USA in 37 of 44 technologies that it examined, across defence, space, artificial intelligence, advanced materials and quantum technology.
And yet, several of the countries that China engages with are also wary of the consequences of their dealings with Beijing. Huge national debt resulting from trophy infrastructure projects, as in the case of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, has made the BRI less attractive than it once seemed. And China’s aggressive posture on maritime territorial disputes with several ASEAN countries will likely prevent them from choosing Beijing as their preferred representative in the global arena. Today, China is caught between a hostile West and a number of increasingly hostile neighbors from India to Japan and parts of ASEAN.
India on the other hand, is proving more adept at the multi-alignment that is the diplomatic tightrope walk necessary to promote national interests, while maintaining friends on the different sides of multiple fences. The Ukraine-Russia war has been a disaster, directly or indirectly, for most of the world. But India has emerged from it on good terms with Russia, the West, and the Global South. No mean feat, although not nearly enough to make its claims to being a “vishwaguru,” a reality. For the moment, the reality is that there is no vishwaguru – even as the claimants for the title are multiplying. We live in interesting times.
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Until soon,
Pallavi
Nice analysis!