How Do Chinese Perceive India
Chinese view Indians as overly boastful and failing to live up to their claims
Dear Global Jigsaw,
Here is the final part of my wide ranging conversation with leading Chinese India-studies scholar, Mao Keji. This part of the interview is open to all, although the previous two were behind a pay wall.
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I am summarizing some highlights of the conversation below before reproducing the final (lightly edited) excerpts.
The idea that India and China are truly equals contradicts objective realities and damages India’s interests. Artificially elevating India to a position it does not yet occupy, merely for the sake of prestige, constitutes a form of deception.
In the early 1990s, China and India had similar GDP per capita figures. However, by 2024, China’s GDP per capita had risen to more than five times that of India, clearly illustrating the substantial gap in their comprehensive national strengths.
Realistically acknowledging one’s position isn’t shameful, rather, it’s the fastest route to genuinely enhancing one’s strength and achieving true global prominence.
Ideally, China should be India’s closest industrialization partner, supplying India with capital, talent, intermediate products, management know-how, and essential components for industrial growth. This is similar to how developed economies supported China’s industrialization in earlier decades.
A common sentiment among Chinese companies today : “Money made in India stays in India; good luck trying to bring it home.”
Chinese often view Indians as overly boastful and failing to live up to their claims, discounting Indian promises accordingly. Conversely, Indians might perceive Chinese individuals as deliberately understated or deceptive, suspecting ulterior motives behind their proposals.
The full text of the interview is below. Before continuing to read please consider becoming a paid subscriber of The Global Jigsaw.
PA: Does the fact that the West often equates India and China bother China, given the fact that China is so much ahead of India in economic and developmental terms? In other words, does China feel that India gets a “pass” on human rights issues and other problems, simply because the West wants to use it as a counterbalance to China?
MK: This is an intriguing question that I have considered in-depth. I don’t harbor any particular resentment or discomfort about Western countries frequently placing China and India on the equal footing. This is largely because I fully comprehend the intentions and rationale behind the West’s approach—understanding this removes any emotional uneasiness. Clearly, Western countries aim to position India as a strategic counterweight to China, fostering mutual confrontation between the two Asian giants. By doing so, Western nations not only mitigate immediate threats from China but also neutralize any medium-to-long-term threats posed by India. With these two giants entangled in ongoing rivalry, Western nations can rest easy without significant geopolitical concerns.
To achieve this, Western countries inevitably adopt double standards, being lenient towards India. If one fully recognizes this strategic motivation, there is no sense of injustice or resentment. If Western countries provide this kind of strategic goodwill, it’s undeniably positive news for India, and India should seize this opportunity to maximize its gains.
However, there is a genuine concern in the misconception that India and China are truly equals. This idea contradicts objective realities and ultimately damages India’s interests. Therefore, I believe acknowledging facts, respecting existing gaps, and understanding the actual situations in both countries is most conducive to the long-term development of Sino-Indian relations as well as for India itself. Artificially elevating India to a position it does not yet occupy, merely for the sake of perceived equality or prestige, essentially constitutes a form of deception.
In the early 1990s, China and India had similar GDP per capita figures. However, by 2024, China’s GDP per capita had risen to more than five times that of India, clearly illustrating the substantial gap in their comprehensive national strengths—a gap that neither flattering rhetoric nor self-deception can erase. If stakeholders objectively recognize and adapt their strategies according to this disparity, it would likely represent the most prudent approach for all involved.
An excessively inflated self-perception places unnecessary pressures and complications upon India. Realistically acknowledging one’s position isn’t shameful, rather, it’s the fastest route to genuinely enhancing one’s strength and achieving true global prominence. Conversely, if India indulges excessively in artificial great-power aspirations, it risks incurring needless costs with both the West and China, paradoxically distancing itself further from genuine global status.
PA: What role could China play in India’s industrialization, that is currently not possible because of political problems?
MK: Frankly speaking, no country in the world could potentially contribute more significantly to India’s industrialization than China. This statement is made to reflect reality given the scale, developmental stage gap, and industrial-economic structures of both countries. This reality is clearly visible through the bilateral trade between China and India. Ideally, China should be India’s closest industrialization partner, supplying India with capital, talent, intermediate products, management know-hows, and essential components for industrial growth. This scenario is similar to how developed economies supported China’s industrialization in earlier decades.
As late as October 2019, the joint communiqué released following the second informal summit between the Chinese and Indian leaders in Chennai explicitly mentioned exploring a “manufacturing partnership”(制造业伙伴关系). This now seemingly surprising initiative was personally proposed during the meeting between China’s highest leader and Prime Minister Modi, reflecting significant political determination and policy commitment.
In September 2019, I personally coordinated the Sixth Sino-Indian Strategic Economic Dialogue held in New Delhi, led by He Lifeng, then director of Chins National Development and Reform Commission, accompanied by nearly ten senior departmental officials from the such as high-tech, industry, infrastructure, environmental protection, agriculture, energy, social affairs, and policy research. Such high-level and implementation-oriented involvement clearly indicates genuine intent for practical cooperation rather than mere high-sounding rhetoric.
So, why did manufacturing cooperation ultimately fail to progress? The reason is straightforward: India adopted restrictive policy regime against China. Many observers tend to attribute obstacles in Sino-Indian economic cooperation to the broader political climate like the border disputes, but this is inaccurate. The real issue lies in specific policy choices—India’s decision to link economic matters directly with border issues.
Consequently, since early 2020, India has actively restricted Chinese investments, refused visas to Chinese nationals, banned Chinese apps, seized Chinese companies’ assets, and detained Chinese employees, effectively blocking nearly every channel through which China could assist India’s industrialization. These incidents are well-documented.
At the height of the pandemic, Indian diplomats abroad even publicly encouraged multinational companies to “abandon China and move to India,” openly aligning with American efforts aimed at decoupling from China. Under such circumstances, even if China intended to advance industrial cooperation with India, there were no feasible avenues because all restrictions were imposed unilaterally by India, leaving Chinese businesses powerless.
In my opinion, returning to the business situation of 2019 is now entirely impossible. This impossibility stems both from shifting global geopolitical dynamics and, more significantly, from the Modi government’s linkage policy. Frankly, the future of industrial cooperation between China and India is no longer something Chinese authorities can actively manage.
A common sentiment among Chinese companies today captures this vividly: “Money made in India stays in India; good luck trying to bring it home.” Such skepticism within Chinese business community has nothing to do directly with border disputes or diplomatic relations; rather, it is purely a result of India’s policies.
Despite a continuing boom in Chinese overseas investment, most businesses deliberately avoid India due to difficulties in establishing ventures, securing visas, and ensuring operational compliance, combined with risks in repatriating profits. Businesses naturally prioritize asset and operational safety over geopolitical strategy.
PA:What is the general perception of India amongst average Chinese people today?
MK: This is yet another excellent question. Chinese scholars and ordinary citizens typically hold significantly different perceptions of India. The reason for this discrepancy is that scholars base their views on long-term observation and systematic research, resulting in relatively comprehensive and balanced perspectives.
In contrast, ordinary citizens tend to be heavily influenced by online and social media content, which may well foster extreme emotions and one-sided views. As I’ve mentioned previously, this phenomenon is not unique to China—it occurs universally and requires collaborative efforts to mitigate its negative impact.
I established and operate the South Asia Research Brief, which boasts approximately one million subscribers and has become one of China’s most influential online platforms for South Asian, especially Indian, affairs. Our primary mission is presenting Chinese internet users with a more comprehensive and authentic understanding of India, rather than perpetuating sensationalist stories or biases.
What is the most prevalent impression of India among Chinese citizens today? I have observed that many Chinese internet users perceive Indians as prone to exaggeration and lacking sincerity. For instance, when our platform recently brought up an article about India’s Vision 2047, most comments for it expressed deep-seated skepticism, accusing the Modi government of boasting and setting unattainable goals. One particularly memorable comment cited Modi’s ambitious 2019 pledge to build a $5 trillion economy within five years, noting, “It’s already 2025, and India’s GDP stands at only $3.8 trillion. If this earlier goal wasn’t met, how can we trust India’s aspirations for 2047?”
In fact, this perception is extremely common among the Chinese public, mainly because Chinese culture places high importance on fulfilling promises. As a result, Chinese people typically understate their objectives at the outset to manage expectations effectively. Conversely, in Indian culture—whether in politics, diplomacy, or daily life—people often express aspirations beyond their capabilities to capture attention and emphasize significance, but frequently struggle to deliver. Thus, for the same issue, Chinese individuals instinctively lower expectations, while Indians tend to elevate them, creating substantial perceptual gaps.
Consequently, Chinese individuals often view Indians as overly boastful and failing to live up to their claims, discounting Indian promises accordingly. Conversely, Indians might perceive Chinese individuals as deliberately understated or deceptive, suspecting ulterior motives behind seemingly modest proposals. However, the reality is often simpler than either side imagines.
This particular example illustrates just one aspect of mutual perceptions between China and India. I firmly believe that Chinese public opinion about India isn’t static, rather, it is continually shaped by a multitude of intersecting factors. Thus, as China and India broaden exchanges, particularly strengthening people-to-people interactions, even if significant differences remain, both peoples will better understand the broader context shaping these differences, ultimately fostering more comfortable and constructive coexistence
In conducting and presenting this interview my intention is not to agree with everything that Mao Keji says. Rather it is to introduce the reader to current Chinese thinking on the India-China relationship. In India, there is a tendency to dismiss all Chinese utterances as propaganda. But I believe we would do well to cultivate some cognitive empathy and attempt to understand where some of this thinking is coming from, instead of automatically ascribing it to mendacity.
The India-China relationship is more important than ever before, given the shifting topography of international relations - Trump, tariffs and the ongoing bilateral rapprochement. Ties across the Himalayas will be crucial to the shape of the new global order that is in the making.
What do you think? Let me know in the comments.
Until next week,
Un abrazo,
Pallavi
Perceptive and insightful interview and one would agree largely with the views about Indians. However, I would say that the boasting and overstating of expectations is largely State propoganda has been the hallmark of Indian politicians in the last decade or so. On the contrary, regular citizens tend to be, generally, under-confident and timid in their dealings, especially with Goverment bodies. A hangover from our colonial past but a result of the govt retaining and, probably, enhancing controls on society. I wish there was a mechanism by which governments were measured and scored against the promises and performances, rather than it being left to elections which are, unfortunately, fought largely on date and communal lines.
Great interview. I can totally empathize with many aspects of the Chinese view, particularly the perception that Indians appear boastful and unrealistic. We are both. But I think the interview could have gone deeper to explore the ‘whys’. There lies the rub: the perceived ‘order’ of a centralised, all-controlling state vs the messiness of a democratic, federal system. Moving each calls for different tactics, which could have been debated.